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THE FORMAL.
Science begins with the application of formal
thought, viz., with counting, measuring, and classify-
ing. Only with the assistance of the formal sciences
can we master the material of the sensory data of our
experience, and thus it happens that the formal is the
condition, not of any kind of experience, but of every
systematic experience.
The formal sciences are the tools of cognition.
That to which they cannot be applied remains unex-
plained.
The various formal sciences are constructions of a
purely formal nature. Thus, numbers are a system
of units (i. e. empty forms), the logical categories a
system of ideas representing the various relations that
can obtain among things, etc. These and other sys-
tems of pure forms do not exist ready-made, or in a
latent form in the mind, but must be constructed out
of the purely formal elements obtained from experience
by abstraction.
Animals are incapable of making abstractions, and
that is the reason why they cannot develop formal
thought. Abstraction is the condition of the evolution
of formal thought, for all the formal sciences move in
a definite sphere of abstraction.
We have to distinguish between the rigidly formal,
the purely formal, and the empirically formal. The
last kind of formality comprises the real forms of things
with which we become acquainted in experience. The
purely formal is to be found in the laws of stereometry,
Euclidean geometry, etc., while logic, arithmetic, and
algebra are rigidly formal.
What is the difference? The rigidly formal is the
product of mental operations alone. Our mental ac-
tivity alone is given. Otherwise there is no assump-
tion whatever ; no hypothesis, no axiom. In arith-
metic we count our mental acts, we add and subtract
them ; and out of these operations the whole magnifi-
cent structure of a great formal science is created. We
construct and observe the products of our construction.
There is nothing but certain mental acts and the con-
sequences involved in these acts. In all the rigidly
formal sciences we combine and separate and recom-
bine. By naming the same products with same names
and equating the outcome of two sets of operations
with the same results, we create the material of our
science ourselves, .as the spider spins the w'eb that is
to serve him as his field of operations, out of his own
being. Says an old rhymster :
" LogLus aranciP pL^test cptuparari
^
QttcF subtilt'i didicit telas operari,
Qtt(F sitis visceribus z'olunt consuminari
Et pretiuiu musca siforte queai lagiteari." *
—Tom Wright, " Political Songs of England," p. 209.
Mathematics and pure mechanics are not quite so
rigidly a priori as arithmetic and algebra. Their con-
structions introduce some additional features which
may be called assumptions or axioms, or derivations
from experience, or common notions.
Whatever w§ may call them, they are arbitrary ;
they do not result as a necessary consequence from
the operations with which we start.
While in the construction of rigidly formal sciences
we have no choice left, we find that in the purely formal
sciences there are several constructions possible. In
Euclidean geometry, for instance, we execute, at the
suggestion of the real space-conditions that surround
us, one peculiar construction, because this special kind
of geometry is most serviceable to us ; but there are
other possibilities left, and we can imagine analogous
geometries built by the same mental operations but
starting from other suppositions.
Euclidean geometry is a construction in which,
through one point to a given straight line, one parallel
only can be drawn. We can, however, construct other
kinds of geometry in which, through a point to a given
straight line, either no parallel at all or several paral-
lels can be drawn. t Besides our tridimensional space
we can conceive of four, five, and //dimensional
spaces, and can with perfect precision define all the
* The logician may be compared to a spider who has learned to weave
fine webs, which will be produced from her bowels, and the reward is a fly if
she haply can catch one.
t The latter assumption, viz., that through a point to a straight line sev-
eral parallels can be drawn will produce a' space of negative curvature, while
the former assumption admits of two possibilities, either two straight lines
enclose a space (as, for instance, on the sphere) or two straight lines do not
enclose a space—which produces elliptic geometry so-called, first observed
by Klein. It is doubtful which case Riemann had in mind. (Translated from
a private letter of Professor Lindemann in which he kindly gave a brief expo-
sition of the situation.)
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qualities which such spaces arid their bodies must
possess.
It is a matter of course that as soon as we have
created, by some arbitrary construction, a certain fea-
ture in a formal system, we have to stick to it and take
all its consequences. When we speak of triangles of
Euclidean space, we cannot attribute to them the
qualities of triangles in Lobatschewsky's or Riemann's
space. Each geometry forms an independent domain
for itself. None of them is truer than the other ; and
none of them should be confounded with the other.
The term " rigidly formal" is narrower than "purely
formal." All rigidly formal truths are at the same time
purely formal, but not all purely formal statements are
rigidly formal.
* *
Modern geometry proves that our notion of space
is not rigidly formal ; it is only purely formal. The
statement that real space is tridimensional is not a
necessary product of our mental operations. It is not
on one and the same level with the statement 2 x 2= 4.
The latter is intrinsically necessary. There is no
other possibility left. 2x2 will alwaj's be the same,
and whatever we have called it, so we shall have to
call it again, or at an}' rate regard it as equivalent and
equal. Space, however, for all we know a priori,
might be four or five or .'/-dimensional ; and whether
or not the world-space, i. e. the form of reality, is tri-
dimensional is a matter of experience. Thus tlie state-
ment, real space is tridimensional, contains an em-
pirical or a posteriori element. It does not contain any
information about the material world, the information
it conveys is purely formal still, but it is not rigidly
formal. It cannot be proposed as the only possible
condition of being, for there are other constructions
possible and imaginable. Tridimensional space is one
instance only among innumerable possibilities, and
we have through experience from a posteriori argu-
ments sufficient reasons to believe (or if you prefer, to
be assured) that this one instance is realised in the
actual world in which we live.
Assuming then, from a posteriori arguments, that
world-space is tridimensional, we can forthwith a priori
apply to it all the laws of tridimensional space. All
the various systems of Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometry, of mathematical or any other imaginable
space-constructions are purely formal notions. But
they are not the inevitable consequence of our mental
operations only, they contain, each system its own
peculiar conditions, which are arbitrarily established.
Their character is not necessary, but might be other-
wise.
Arbitrary constructions of such a nature have been
called "axioms" and are now commonly called "as-
sumptions." The one term is as bad as the other. The
name "axiom" suggests that there are indubitable
but improvable truths, and the word "assumption"
implies that we take some supposition for granted
which may not be correct. We might assume the im-
possible or that which is contradictory to the conse-
quences of the operations with which we start. We
might assume that 2x2 is sometimes 4 and some-
times 5. The word assumption suggests the idea that
our procedure is unfounded. We have neither to ac-
cept any truth without proof, nor are we allowed to
make assumptions. Employing the mental functions
which we possess, we can construct ; and there is a
choice, whether to construct a plane geometry or other
geometries. But a choice is no assumption.
*
* *
If the difference between the rigidly formal and the
purely formal had been kept in mind by modern
mathematicians, much confusion and many errors ris-
ing out of confusion would have been avoided. It has
been said, for instance, that we do not know whether
or not the sum of the angles in a plane triangle
is exactly iSo'; it may be somewhat more or less.
They grant that it is very approximately so and de-
clare that even the greatest triangles we can measure
are too small to discover the deviation. As instances
parallaxes of stars have been adduced, which make
measurements on triangles whose sides sweep through
cosmic space over the whole stellar universe ; but it is
a pity for this class of geometers that such deviations
as are found in these calculations keep within the rea-
sonable limits of errors which occur in all analogous
cases of observation. True, that among about forty
measurements two only come out negative. That might
be an argument in favor of a slightly curved space
;
but we can surmise that many other negative measure-
ments have been suppressed as obviously erroneous.*
This view is based upon a misconception of the nature
of the formal sciences.
A modern geometer may deny that world space is
tridimensional, but he cannot deny without inconsis-
tency that the sum of the angles in a plane triangle is
180 degrees, for it is so by construction and cannot be
otherwise unless we reverse the conditions upon which
we have made the construction.
Suppose we construct a circle and propose the the-
orem that in a circle all the peripheral angles upon
equal cords are equal, intending to prove that this fol-
lows with necessity from the qualities of the circle.
Having done so a geometrical friend of ours steps in
and denies the validity of the argument. He says,
"The peripheral angles on equal cords in a circle as
large as the orbit of the earth round the sun are ap-
proximately but not exactly equal. Your theorem may
be right within certain limits and will be sufficient for
» The Monht, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 173-174.
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all the small circles which occur in our practical ex-
perience. But whether it holds good generally is very
doubtful still. In order to know that, we shall have
to make more exact measurements with circles as large
as the milky way. Within a century our children will
probably know more about it than we do now with the
insufficient material at our disposal."
What would we tell him ? We should tell him that
a circle remains a circle as much as a plane triangle
remains a plane triangle ; astronomy may prove that
the orbit of the earth round the sun is only approxi-
mately a circle (celestial bodies move in conic sec-
tions, our earth moving nearly in a circle), but it can
as little prove that peripheral angles on equal cords
are only approximately equal, as the measurement of
parallaxes can induce us to believe that the sum of
plane triangles is onl}' approximately not exactly equal
to 180'.
Suppose that the parallaxes of stars really showed
that these world-sized triangles of astronomy really
and regularly measured somewhat more or less than
180, what would be the conclusion? Would we in-
deed have to revise our mathematics and declare that
mathematics is only approximately true? No, we
should conclude that the rays of light do not travel in
exactly straight lines, that their path is only approxi-
mately straight. However, whether or not the rays
of light travel in straight lines is not a purely formal
question at all ; it is an empirically formal question,
which has as little to do with pure mathematics as the
question whether apples are exact or only approximate
globes.
Important as is the difference between the rigidly
formal and the purely formal (a difference entirely
overlooked by Kant), the difference between the purely
formal and the empirically formal is greater still. It
is so obvious, however, that it has scarcely ever escaped
attention and has led to the well known distinctions
between purely formal mathematics, mechanics, logic,
etc., and applied mathematics, mechanics, logic, etc.
The purely formal sciences exclude all the incidental
deviations of real objects, while the applied formal sci-
ences take notice of them, introducing them as factors
in their calculations.
How near Kant came to the solution of the problem
which actually explains all and is in our opinion the
only satisfactory answer possible, viz., that tlic fonnal
sciences arc piirclx formal constructions, will be seen
from the following passage in Kant's preface to the
second edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason."
"A new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man
(T/iali's, or whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated
the properties of the isosie/i-s triangle. For he found that it was
not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or
the conception of it, as it e.\i5ted in his mind, and thus endeavour
to get at the knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary
to produce these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori loii-
s/rut/ii'ii
; and that, in order to arrive with certainty aI a priori
cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other properties
than those which necessarily followed from that which he had
himself, in accordance with his conception, placed in the object.'
After this explanation Kant falls back upon the theory
that the a priori or purely formal elements a.re given by
the mind, which is quite another thing than constructed
by the mind. If they were ' ' given by the mind " they
would exist in the mind as a latent knowledge, in the
same waj' that we know many things of which we are
not conscious and to recollect which may rei]uire con-
siderable mental effort. But if they are constructed by
the mind, we need only look upon certain mental
operations as given. The products of these operations
are the object of the formal sciences. And in this way
we can indeed escape all the perplexing consequences
of Kant's transcendentalism.
*
* *
Kant was puzzled that we could know anything
a priori concerning the constitution of things. He saw
only two possibilities ; either, he said, we have derived
this knowledge from the things by experience, or we
ourselves have put it into the things to which it really
does not belong. The former possibility being ex-
cluded, since the purely formal truths are a priori,
Kant accepted the other horn of the dilemma declaring
that our faculty of cognition did not conform to the
objects, but contrariwise, that the objects conform to
cognition. The objects do not in themselves possess
form, but our mind is so constituted that it cannot
help attributing form and everything formal to the ob-
jects of our experience.
Kant did not see that form might be a property of
all existence that, in that case, the purely formal in
things would be of the same nature as the purely formal
in man's mind.
Nature is throughout activity, and so our existence
is throughout activity. Nature is constantly combining
and separating ; and these same operations are inalien-
able functions of our mind. They are given together
with our existence.
When we construct some purely formal configura-
tion with our nature-given mental operations, it will be
the same as any other construction which has been
made in the same way, be it in the domain either of
things or of other minds. Nature performs the same
operations which appear in man's mental activity. Be-
ing a part of existence, what is more natural than that
man's bodily and mental existence partakes of the same
form as all the other parts of the world that surrounds
him.
A great and important part of our knowledge con-
sists of rigidly formal theorems ; they are a priori.
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And these rigid!}' formal theorems contain actual infor-
mation concerning the real world. And why? Because
they are systematic reconstructions of a certain feature
of reality b}' operations which take place throughout
the universe. When Kant says : Our mind "dictates "
certain laws to the objects of experience; he uses a
wrong expression or takes a poetical license seriousl}'.
The mind "dictates" nothing to reality. Reality is in-
dependent of what we think it to be. That which Kant
calls dictating is a mere determining, a mere foretell-
ing or predicting by constructing in our mind an anal-
ogous model.
The agreement between our model and reality
proves only that the model is correct, it does not prove
that the model does any dictating. The model dictates
as little to reality as a barometer dictates what air-
pressure there is to be in the atmosphere.
The purely formal gives information concerning
things so general that they are the same throughout the
universe, and the rigidly formal concerning things
so universal that they are the same in all possible uni-
verses, p. c.
THOUGHT-CONCEPTION.
BY C. STANILAND WAKE.
It is affirmed by Prof. Max Miiller that in every act of the
mind we distinguish three things—the act, the instrument or fac-
ulty, and the result or product. Thus, the concept is said to be the
product of conception as the act of the intellect, the faculty. This
is not, however, a proper application of the term "faculty," see-
ing that the intellect is neither a mere mental form or aptitude,
nor a faculty in the proper sense, as defined by Mr. G. H. Lewes,
of the acquired variation of activity of an organ. The intellect is,
indeed, sometimes called the regulative faculty, but it is in reality
a function of the material organism, or rather of the highest part
of it, the brain. The concept which results from the act of con-
ception is a thought-unit, and hence it is the product of that phase
of thinking which answers to concep'.ion. Although there is much
difference in the use of the term thought (thinking), yet most psy-
chologists practically agree in their conclusions. Lewes affirms
that the thinking process is common to all psychological phenom-
ena, but he distinguishes between thought by images, which ani-
mals possess along with man. and the thought by signs or symbols
which is the special attribute of man. When it is said that man
alone can think, it is intended, therefore, merely to assert that he
alone thinks by means of language symbols.
Agreeably to the wide sense in which he uses the term thouglit,
the author of "Problems" affirms that animals as well as men
have language. He says: " Language in its widest sense cannot be
denied to animals as a function of expression of feelings—the lan-
guage of gestures and cries is even made by them a rudimentary
function of communication. But this function never becomes a
faculty, and above all never rises to the expression of ideas, the
communication of knowledge." Thus animal language is not hu-
man language, the language of signs, which as Prof. Max Miiller
asserts, is the product of thought, using this term in its higher
sense, as thinking by means of symbols. From this point of view,
it is evident that language and "thought" are inseparable, that is,
one cannot exist without the other. The faculty of language is,
therefore, at the same time the faculty of thinking, and the thought
and the word have been formed together as internal and external
expressions of one and the same mental operation.
The truth of this conclusion is evident from the consideration
that "thought," although not audible language, is nevertheless
actually uttered. It is not at all unusual for thinking to be accom-
panied by spoken words unconsciously produced, which is popu-
larly called "thinking aloud"; and many persons cannot read
without forming the words with the lips, the sound of which may
or may not be audible. If the process of thinking is attended to,
it will be found that the thought-symbols or words are really pro-
duced as vocal representations, as though they were reverberations
in the brain of words before spoken aloud. The constant ac ivity
of thought is thus the continual passage through the mind of the
phantoms of words previously uttered. The brain may be likened
to a telephonic apparatus which is constantly repeating the lan-
guage impressed upon it, language which under abnormal condi-
tions of the nervous system may appear to the subject to be actu-
ally spoken by an inner voice quite independent of himself.
Usually this is a proof that the law of association has ceased to
operate harmoniously, and that discord has thus been introduced
into consciousness. Under normal conditions and in wakeful mo-
ments, the flow of thought or unspoken language is under the reg-
ulation of the intellect, which by its inhibitive and directive power
may guide thought into a special channel or rearrange the sequence
of its symbols, and if necessary render them really vocal. In tleep
the regulative principle is no longer operative, and under that con-
dition thought appears to be on the lower level of the subconscious,
but its verbal symbols are recognised and often appear to lake on
the vocal form. This is the most apparent, however, between
sleeping and waking. Often when about to fall asleep have I
heard a voice speak as though conversing, but when aroused by it,
as was usually the case, I have known that it was a mere phantasy
of the brain.
It was said above that the thought and the word are internal
and external expressions of one and the same mental operation.
Every word must be, therefore, a concept or thought unit, while
language as a collection of symbols is the necessary accompani-
ment of the activity of conception or thinking, the consideration of
which fact throws great light on the origin of language. For until
the intellect was able to carry on the process of conception, no
concept could be formed, and therefore there could be no language.
•As soon as that process commenced, however, thought-symbols
would be intuitively formed and language developed. This must
have been in the earliest infancy of the human race. The posses-
sion of language in its highest form is the very test of humanity,
because it is vocal thought, and an animal that has not the power
of thinking, that is, of using signs in the process of thought, is not
a human being. The origin of language in "the definite sense of
expression of conceptual thought by conceptual words," is that of
conceptual thought itself. As Prof. Max Miiller affirms,* the sci-
ence of language clearly shows that every word coincides from the
very beginning with a general concept. How words originated is
of secondary importance, but the explanation given by Noire, that
they were " the clamor lorconiitans of the conscious acts of men "
is perhaps the most probable. Every word would be the vocal ex-
pression of a thought, and as language would be useless, if possi-
ble, without society, it would from the first express the general
thought, which thenceforth would be represented by the uttered
sound or word.
Hence language and thought are not merely two sides of the
same thing ; they are the same thing in different relations, that is,
in relation to others sensible and insensible, although in relation
to self they may be equally sensible. Unspoken verbal thoughts
may be represented to the mind as both visible and audible sym-
bols, just as any other images or sounds may be thus represented.
This was evidently recognised by the ancient Greeks who, as
* Tkrcc Lectures on the Science ofLanguage, pp. 92, et seqq.
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pointed out by Prof. Max Muller, used the word /og-os in the sense
of discourse, whether internal or external, showing that they had
a knowledge of the identity of language and thought. ' This truth
has an important bearing on the question of the origin of language,
which according to Noires theory is that of the concept itself. The
explanation given by this theory of the " natural genesis of con-
cepts" is accepted by Prof. Max Miiller, who finds that the germs
of all conceptual language, the so-called roots, "express wiih few
exceptions the repeated acts of men " ; and concludes that as, ac-
cording to Noire, " the germs of all conceptual thought were to be
found in the consciousness of our repeated acts," these two pro-
cesses were "but two sides of one and the same process in the
evolution of human thought and human language." Moreover, "as
the sounds which accompanied the common acts of men, and the
remnants of which became fixed as roots, were used not by one
man only, but by men acting in common, they were intelligible to
the whole community."* And yet T. Bailey Saunders affirms that
its assumption of " ideal intuition " is destructive of the value of
Noire's system as an account of the origin of reason, and that this
theory does not offer any real explanation of the rise of conceptual
thought. Mr. Saunders goes so far, indeed, as to affirm that such
an explanation is not possible, a view which it is not difficult to
show is erroneous.
According to Noire's theory a word is an audible presentation,
produced by an act of will, of some visible representation in the
external world with which it is invariably connected. This con-
nection consists in creative action—"men engaged in some com-
mon activity relieve their feelings by the utterance of cries at the
same time, as the product of their work is growing under their
hands." The fact that any particular sound becomes representa-
tive of a particular action is due lo the power of association, and
as soon as this Association takes place, the essential resemblance
of all like operations is recognised by the faculty of ideal intuition,
which operates as a binding force or /og-os. The combination of
the object and the word is a concept, and the main attribute of
our reason. The object is only particular and the sound is only
particular, but when once the meaning of what we see has been
discovered and expressed by a sound, "once the object has been
named, the generality of its nature is affirmed and we have a con-
cept." The will is the root of all activity, and "as the object pro-
duced by the will unites in itself the three forms of time, space,
and causality, it comes into being under the influence of ideal and
wholly universal conditions." Mr. Saunders well observes that
while Kant and Schopenhauer proved the important part played
by the subject in the acquisition of knowledge, Noire has shown
"how indispensable in the same connection is the c/yVe/, which
can be known only, he declares, by being named, and reason is
impossible without speech." f
It is remarkable that in the Old Testament legend of the gar-
den of Eden, Jehovah is represented as bringing the animals he
had created to the first man, to see what he would call them :
"and whatsoever the man called every living creature, that was
the name thereof. And the man gave names to all cattle, and to
the fowls of the air, and to every beast of the field." The animals
thus brought before the man were afterwards known by their
names, just as the objects referred to by Noire were known by the
names given to them by man. But what led to the giving of par-
ticular names, or in other words, what was the principle which
guided man in his conceptual work ? Noire says "ideal intuition,"
by which the mind perceives the causa! nexus between the object
and the sound by which its meaning is expressed. This explana-
tion, however, in reality explains nothing. The basis of the whole
process is sensuous experience, and the genesis of the concept lies
in the passage from that experience to the knowledge of the ob-
* The Monist, July, iSgi, pp. 580-581.
t The Open Court, p; 2515 et seqq.
ject, which consists in its being named. To take an example given
by Noire, the hole which was formed by the common activity of a
number of men must have been seen and observed by them in the
course of construction. When it was completed its fitness was
recognised, and a cry was uttered, as the result of the recognition,
by the common voice. But what caused the cry ? Surely not the
sudden idea, arising spontaneously in several minds, that the pro-
duct of the joint labor was a hole. The hole must have been made
for a purpose, and the cry was the assertion that the purpose was
fulfilled ; or, rather, it should be said that the cry was a continu-
ous or repeated one, while the purpose was being fulfilled. In
other words, it denoted the possession by the object of a quality,
which the cry thenceforth connoted.
Hence, the giving of the name did not spring from the action
of the will in relation to the object, but in the perception of a
quality possessed by the object, whether as the resu/t of the hiiuiaii
lutkitv or of the lulivity of nature. That perception was due lo
the activity of the intellect, which, and not the will, was the active
principle in the origination of conception acd of language. The
intellect is the governing or regulating principle of the mind and
hence of the will itself, which is merely the expression of the
mental constitution. The organic condition of intellect is con-
sciousness, which, as being higher than sensibility, has a percep-
tion, not of objects as sensuous impressions, but of that which
gives "knowledge" of objects. This power of the intellect is what
is meant by abstraction, but before we can abstract we must rec-
ognise that which has to be abstracted, and therefore it should be
called insight. The function of the intellect is to regulate, but its
faculty is that perception which gives a knowledge of the attributes
of objects, that is, of their constituent qualities, which form the
basis of generalisation, and therefore of reasoning itself,
Mr. G. H. Lewes, when treating of the sphere of intellect and
the logic of signs, remarks that "animals and infants have various
visual experiences of red, blue, brown, orange, etc., each of which
can be re-instated through its image. But they have no coiuef-
tton of red, blue, or orange ; they have no conception of color,
which unlike red, blue, orange, etc., includes and symbolises them.
In the phrase, 'red is a color, ' we express what no sensation of
red alone can teach. Color is not red, nor blue, nor green, nor
orange It is the sign of an operation, an abstraction from vari-
ous experiences, a logical ael incorporated in a vocal act." It is gen-
erally agreed that in this power of "separating the various aspects
of things and fixing them in names" lies the source of man's men-
tal superiority over animals, but whence comes this power ? It is
the activity of the intellect itself which takes cognisance, not only
of the ever-varying phenomena of nature, but also of the qualities
of objects on which the changes in such phenomena depend. The
faculty of inner perception, possessed by the intellectual sight,
may be identified with the faculty of reflection, which, according
to Locke, is a chief source of our ideas, but it has a much wider
objective range, as it is not limited to the observation of internal
phenomena. Long before that faculty concerned itself with the
phenomena of consciousness, it was engaged with the external
phenomena of nature. Mr. Saunders asks in relation to Noire's
theory: "What is an ideal intuition, coming into play in the
origin of concept, if it is not the finding and separating force of
the mind which penetrates through sensuous experience to under-
lying unity?"* But the separation must come first, as otherwise
there could be no penetration, and the unity is conferred by the
conception attendant on the process. The fact is, as I long smce
pointed out, f that in reflection on external nature the mind be-
comes cognisant of the qualities of objects as distinct from the ob-
jects in which they inhere. Those qualities contain in themselves,
from their very nature as such, the possibility of generalisation,
* The Open Court, p. 2535.
t Chapters on Man, (l368,) p. 28 et seqq.
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and the names by which they are symbolised are thus capable of
expressing general ideas. It is indeed only by its qualities that an
object is perceived through the senses at all, and on the mere pre-
sentation to the mind of an external object the impression pro-
duced by a particular quality might be intuitively represented in
vocal expression without reference to any such combined activity
of the will as Noire supposes to have given rise to the first articu-
late sounds.
The primitive words used by man, although capable of ex-
pressing general ideas, would not be developed concepts, or even
true concepts at all, in the sense of actually giving expression to
general ideas. Although they represented objects through par-
ticular qualities, which, as possessed by other objects of the same
kind, formed the basis of future generalisations, yet the objects
them.selves alone were taken cognisance of. It was only when, at
a much later date, through the increased activity of the faculty of
reflection, the full meaning of symbolic sounds, as containing in
themselves the germ of generalisation was recognised, that the true
concept was formed. This becomesclear when the genesis of the con-
cept is understood. In this sense only can it be asserted that objects
are not known before they are named, and therefore that animals
cannot know objects. The perception of an object is a knowledge of
it rt.t siu/i, or as a whole, although not of its qualities or proper-
ties ; the separation of which by analytical reasoning explains
away the objective reality. Lewes says, it is true, that "to the
animal and to the infant there is but knowledge of particulars
;
the subject and the predicate are but one for them. Objects,
therefore,— in one sense,—do not exist for them—only feelings
connected with external signs. To us feelings with external signs
are n/hibutfs, qualities of objects ; but this is because we have
reached the abstraction of objects, apart from their felt attributes,
—in logical phrase, the distinction between subject and predicate,
— and to us objects are not only present feelings, but syntheses of
past and present ; and these syntheses are reconstructed particu-
lars, which are detached from their surroundings and are made to
enter into new constructions."*
Thus it may be said f that " language enables us to construct
objects, in the philosophical sense of the term, by separately nam-
ing, and thus giving separate ideal existence to those feelings of a
group which are invariable and predominant, as distinguished from
the feelings which are variable and accidental." But this con-
struction is not a creation of the objects themselves. It is merely
an analysis of them, and their explanation in language which is an
expression, not of the objects, but of our thoughts of them. As it
is said, "words are not the names of things, but of concepts ; and
the concept expresses not the essential or true nature of the thing,
but only what we are able to think of it." The concept expressed
in symbol is an ideal representation of the object, and therefore a
thought-creation, but it is a mistake to suppose that we cannot
form a true notion, however limited it may be, of the object apart
from the conception, and still more to affirm that the object does
not exist apart from the conceiving mind. The object is first pre-
sented in sensation, and the perception of it through the senses is
not only a knowledge of the object, but a tnic knowledge of it, so
far as this goes. In fact, without this perception there could be
no conception of the object, the image of which must first be re-
ceived through the senses before the intellect can cognise those
qualities which it afterwards recreates as the concept or thought-
object in verbal symbol.
A perfect concept is a thought-unit, that is, it is the result of
a complete application of the three primary laws of thought—a sep-
aration or division of the attributes of the object in accord with
the laws of contradiction or limitation and excluded middle or af-
firmation, and a definition of the object under the law of identity,
* Problems, Vol. Ill, p. 487.
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which, as Lewes affirms, constitutes the principle of equivalence.
The concept or thought-object is thus the expression of certain
attributes atstracted by the intellect from the object as perceived.
These attributes are dependent for their separate existence on the
logical process of division, and although they are again identified in
thought to form the ideal object or concept, yet the very existence
of this concept is evidence not only of the existence of the real
object which is reflected in thought, but also that it possesses the
attributes which are embodied in the concept. The objectivity of
both the external object and the verbal symbol in which the con-
cept is expressed is equally real, although the reality of the former
is in relation to sense-perception, while that of the latter is in re-
lation to the thinking subject of which it is the creation ; whereas
the external object is not dependent for its existence on the per-
ceiving subject. It is true that, according to Lewes, " the only
meaning we can attach to Reality is that every Real has a corre-
sponding feeling, or group of feelings, some of them actual, others
virtual. Reals are objective judgments, and judgments are groups
of subjects and predicates, sensations, and inferences."* But we
are compelled, by our mental constitution, to refer certain sensa-
tions to external influences, that is, to infer that they are due to
the action of external objects, answering to the mental images
which accompany such sensations. This is indeed required by, or
is at least consistent with, the statement that the thing actually
exists as a group of relations, and that we may view it either syn-
thetically as a group, or analytically in its several elements. That
is to say, " we may dissect what is given as a whole of feeling into
what is inferred to be its constituent parts. We have what is here ;
and we seek to conjure up ideally the vision of what was there,
and 'lvHI be elsewhere. " This is the ideal reality, but the external
whole of feeling is none the less real as an object of sensation,
although it has not been subjected in thought and thus entered
into the realm of conception.
CURRENT TOPICS.
The World's Fair Sunday closing question has reached the
comic stage, and I must indulge in a little cynical amusement when
I hear " most potent, grave, and reverend " councils of theological
men denouncing the directors who propose to open the Exposition
on Sundays, as " anarchists more deeply red with treason than the
men who fired on Sumter." There is retributive satire in that
compliment because the directors of the Fair and the stockholders
in the enterprise belong to the classes who, with a few magnani-
mous exceptions, have condemned as "anarchists" nearly all the
men in Chicago who have agitated for better laws and purer courts
of law. They have stigmatised as "anarchists" nearly all the men
who have criticised the ways of Mammon in Chicago, and who
have pleaded for larger justice and more equal chances for the
poor. How do they like the nickname when it is fastened upon
themselves ? To be sure, they retort in counter-flatteries and call
those venerable divines " witch burners," "inquisitors," "bigots,"
"fanatics," and similar names of endearment, but there is not so
much poison in all those* titles as in the one mad-dog incantation
" anarchist." In the language of Sir Lucius O'Trigger the dispute
is " a very pretty quarrel as it stands," and I confess that I enjoy
both sides of it. It reminds me of the Sunday question that broke
up our little community at Marbletown, and divided the citizens
into two hostile factions that hated one another for five years ; and
I enjoyed both sides of that. It was a curious example of the
manner in which a national festival because it happened to fall on
Sunday was crucified between two secular days ; "which the same
I would rise to explain."
* *
It was in the fifties ; I forget the exact year, but no matter, it
was the year in that decade when the 4th of July fell on Sunday.
* Problems, Vol. II, p. 42.
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About a month ahead we called a meeting to make preparations
for a proper observance of the day, Procession to the grand stand
in the grove, Prayer by the Chaplain, Singing by the choir, Read-
ing the Declaration, Oration, Free barbecue for all the country
round. Sports in the afternoon. Fireworks in the evening, and Joe
Ricks the blacksmith firing his anvil during the whole proceedings
by way of a national salute. The entire programme was agreed
upon in a friendly and patriotic way, when some spirit of mischief
incarnate in Ben Strong prompted him to suggest what nobody
had thought of, that the 4th of July came that year on Sunday,
"wharfor," said Ben, "I would move Mr. Charman, if I could git
a second, that we have the celebration on Monday the 5th." He
did get a second, and then old Squire Norton moved as an amend-
ment "that the celebration take place on Saturday the 3d." The
debate on the question lasted until midnight, when the meeting
broke up in a row, the Saturday men resolving to have the cele
bration on Saturday, and the Monday men going into training for
a grander celebration on Monday than the Saturday men dared
think of. I confess that I was on both sides of the question, for
the dispute meant a double 4th of July for me, and all free of ex-
pense, wherefore I patronised both festivals with impartial patriot-
ism. In addition to that, about fifty of us had a most delightful
picnic by the big spring on the banks of the Marble river, and we
had it on the exact 4th of July, speeches, songs, games, and all, on
the very Sunday itself, which by its brightness appeared to be
l^onored in the observance ; and as far as the eye could reach, all
nature smiled approval ; the trees and the birds, the river and the
fishes, the prairies rolling like the sea, and the proud imperial
corn. All bore testimony that ours was the true American Sab-
bath ; and years afterward, the Saturday men and the Monday
men agreed that the only rational celebration of Independence had
that year at Marbletown was the picnic of the Sunday men. It will
be but a few years when all the sects will agree that the most ra-
tional, moral, and religious way to have honored the Sabbath in
Chicago in 1893, would have been io throw the great World's Fair
open every Sunday for the enlightenment, the instruction, and the
pleasure of all the people.
In the summer of 184S, I was returning from a semi-piratical
picnic in which I had been engaged with four hundred other tu-
multuous young men. We were sailing the salt seas on board the
crazy and rheumatic old ship "Russia"; and that old buccaneer
was bringing us home from Mexico which we had invaded ; nd
trampled like reincarnations of the old Norse rovers who vexed the
shores of England a thousand years ago. In the gulf we caught a
monster shaik and landed him on the deck where he flopped about
in impotent rage while we smoked our pipes in his face and laughed
at his vanished power. And ever since, when I see a monster ty-
ranny shorn of its ability for mischief, still invoking evil, I think
of that captive shark flopping about on the old ship "Russia"
homeward bound from Vera Cruz to New Orleans. I saw him
flopping again last Sunday morning at the Jefferson Park Presby-
terian Church, where the pastor preaching against opening the
World's Fair on Sunday, administered the sacrament of religious
consolation to the communicants in this benes-olent form, he said :
"In some way God will save our Sabbath for us and lake venge-
ance on those who have provoked him to anger. The cyclone is
his and ten cases of cholera might produce a panic that would ruin
the exposition." This heavenly hope roused the spirits of the con-
gregation and gave a more spiritual tone to the succeeding hymn.
This oblique foreboding was a prayer for pestilence and storm, and
within the prayer was a sentence that once would have meant
thumbscrew and rack and rope and fire for the men who would
open to the people on Sunday anything so good as the Fair. Now
the omen and the curse and the sentence and the old gothic anath-
ema are nothing but the floppings of the shark, helpless and dying
on the deck.
*
* *
The patriotic struggle to make the United States of .\merica
the greatest and meanest of the nations is siill going on. and with
gratifying success in both directions. The World's Fair is the
wonder of the age, and the Geary law has been declared constitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. This act of congressional barbarity
was not seriously meant; it was passed as a bid for the "sand
lot" vote on the Pacific slope, and for some bits of the "working-
man" vote in other States, in the hope and expectation that the
SupremeCourt would veto the lawafter it had served its demagogue
purpose. This was another case of hanging yourself expecting
somebody to come along and cut the rope; the Supreme Court
sustained the law, to the disappointment of the vote-mongers who
had passed it, and the President of the United States, ashamed of
the ignoble duty cast upon him of transporting a hundred thou-
sand Chinese denizens of this country innocent of crime, is driven
to the humiliation of pretending that he cannot enforce the law,
because he has no money to pay for their deportation. True,
three of the judges dissented from the opinion, and we ought to
be thankful for that. They held the law to be unconstitutional, for
imposing "cruel and unusual punishments," and for abolishing
trial by jury. One of them, the venerable Judge Field, with manly
indignation, declared the law to be "brutal and inhuman," and
he said that " every section of it violated the constitution" He
very wisely added that the law was "fraught with the greatest
dangers to the constitutional liberties of the people." This law
cannot stand. There is not strength enough in the army and the
navy to sustain it against the moral condemnation of Judge Field.
No American in any foreign country will dare to defend it against
the withering description of it given by Judge Field. We wan-
tonly provoke the derision of the world, when with Geary laws
among our national statutes we have the self-righteous vanity to
send missionaries to China to convert the Chinese from Confucian
barbarism to American Christianity.
*
* #
I have been favored with a copy of T'ie Moslem \\\n IJ, alarge,
weekly, three-column, sixteen-page magazine, published in the city
of New 'i'ork. It is well printed on good paper and filled with
articles of high literary merit and excellent moral tone. Its mis-
sion is explained in the following motto, " Devoted to the interests
of the American Islamic propaganda." Its frontispiece is a grace-
ful Moslem temple, illuminated by the crescent moon that guided
Mohammed in his famous flight ; and its prospectus, written by
the editor, Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb, is courageous,
dignified, and more tolerant than sectarian proclamations usually
are. Mr. Webb is an .American who has made a pilgrimage in
India, and returning to his native land he raises the standard of
the crescent and challenges the cross to a comparison of morals,
of bibles, and of laws. This is like the defiance hurled at Goliath
of Gath by the stripling David, the son of Jesse ; and like David,
Mr. Webb advances to the conflict in the name of the Lord of
hosts. It is a very exciting rivalry ; the Christian having failed to
convert the Mohammedan in Bombay, therefore, in hopes of bet-
ter luck, the Mohammedan will try to convert the Christian in
New York. If they would mingle their qualities more freely, both
might be improved. Spiritually and morally the Christian ought
to be more of a Mohammedan, while in worldly and corporeal at-
tributes the Mohammedan might well be more of a Christian.
While the two theologies are very much alike and somewhat in
decay, I am inclined to the opinion of a major of my regiment who
was ordered before the " Board " for examination as to his fitness
for that elevated rank, .\mong other foolish things, they asked
him to explain the comparative merits of the Christian and the
Mohammedan religions. He answered thus: "Well, I think the
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Mohammedan religion is the best, because it has only one GoH,
while the Christian religion has three. Gentlemen, I'm a Uni-
tarian."
* *
This week there is a conference of editors in Chicago ; a Co-
lumbian Exposition of editors ; editors of all sexes, nationalities,
and colors ; editors from all the corners of the earth ; the most
cosmopolitan gathering of miscellaneous writers ever known ; more
brains and information to the acre than was ever concentrated be-
fore since the world began. As Mr. Lafayette Young, one of the
Western editors remarked, in the language of the bojindless prai-
rie : " Here, in this congress of thought, the nations of the earth
are in committee of the whole on the condition of all mankind."
Judging from the speeches, every editor present is qualified to be
a professor of ethics in a theological college, and they all experi-
mentally know just what a newspaper ought to be. In the language
of that veteran editor. Colonel McClure, the newspaper "repre-
sents the enlightened progress of the age, liberalising government,
liberalising the pulpit, liberalising everything." The layman,
listening, wonders why men who know so well what the news-
papers of other editors ought to be, publish their own on a differ-
ent plan, and think only of what will sell. The demand is for
news of a stimulating kind, and they furnish it. No doubt, saloon-
keepers would rather sell milk than whisky ; but they find a de-
mand for fiery drink, and they sell what their patrons want, ex-
actly as editors do. Colonel McClure gave censure and apology
together when he said : " The sensational newspaper must have a
sensation every day, or it ceases to have subscribers ; if it has
nothing to give, it must invent ; it must so color the truth when it
has it, that the truth ceases to be the truth." Certainly; news-
papers are supported, not by moral precepts, but by subscribers,
and it is not from "enlightened progress," but from subscribers,
that newspaper dividends come. Subject to that slight mental
reservation, every editor present soared aloft with Mr. Henry A.
Castle, of St. Paul, in the following flight of eloquence, an excel-
lent specimen of that free imagination which distinguishes our
newspaper style in the West : "With solemnity of reverent bene-
diction let the germs of unstained thought be sent forth on the
ebbs and flows of a regenerated journalism. Floating or flying
they will speed to nature's farthest verge."
M. M. Trumbjll.
CORRESPONDENCE.
LEGERDEMAIN AND SPIRITUALISM.
To the Editor of The Open Court :
You will kindly permit me to say that it will afford me great
pleasure and perhaps be of much value to many minds to engage
Max Dessoir in just such a controversy as you hint, and it will
personally afford me the highest satisfaction to know that among
the few men of science Max Dessoir is open to conviction and
truth. I personally ask the editor, if in the efforts of reconciling
science with religion, which is the platform of 7'he Open Court, it
ever occurred that such reconciliation did not stop at or on the
tnaterial plane and that it is the duty of The Open Court for the
furtherance of science and knowledge to impartially examine the
phenomena of spiritualism—an opportunity for such examination
being presented right in Chicago. Let an impartial, honest, truth-
seeking committee be appointed by Tlie Open Court to make such
investigations of these phenomena, as independent and automatic
slate-writing, seership, clairvoyancy, clairaudiency, trance-me-
diumship, inspirational speaking, and give the world its fearless
verdict and results of such examination, and The Open Court will
perform an inestimable favor to inquiring humanity. Will it do
it, or is this tedious and tiresome process of the reconciliation of
science and religion to be limited to the domain of material science
and so-called established philosophy. It seems to me that these
phenomena need to be considered, or there is a reconciliation that
is a pretense and delusion.
J. C. F. Grumbine.
[Spiritists have an inclination to brand all those views which
do not endorse spiritism as materialism. And Mr. Grumbine, in
a like manner, is inclined to reproach The Open Court with stop-
ping "at or on the material plane." There is a great difference
between believing in spirits, ghosts, or bodiless souls, and denying
spirituality altogether. While we have no belief in spirits, we be-
lieve in the existence of spirit. We regard spirituality as the very
essence of nature, and without it the world would be a meaning-
less heap of matter.
Mr. Grumbine expresses satisfaction at learning that Dr.
Max Dessoir is " open to conviction and truth," meaning thereby,
that he, unlike other scientists, cherishes the opinion that there is
something in spiritism. It appears from this that others, who have
reasons to distrust the facts of spiritism, are not open to convic-
tion and truth.
In a like manner, a circle-squarer complains of the large body
of scientists as not being "open to conviction and truth," because
they refuse to investigate his solution.
We have reasons for not believing in spirits, as we have rea-
sons for not believing in circle-squaring. But is it right to say that
we are not open to conviction and truth ? Disprove our reasons and
we shall surrender them.
Should we find a good opportunity of investigating the prob-
lems of spiritism, clairvoyance, mediumship, etc., we shall be glad
to avail ourselves of the occasion
—
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